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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §
78-2a-3(2)(j) since this appeal was transferred from the Utah Supreme Court to the Utah
Court of Appeals on July 21, 2004. R. at 117.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUES. ORDINANCES AND RULES
The following constitutional provisions and statutes are determinative of the
appeal:
1.

U.S. CONST., amend. V.
"Nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation."
4

2.

UTAH CONST., art. I, § 22.

"Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just
compensation."
3.

§ 63-30-10.5. Waiver of immunity for taking private
property without compensation

UTAH CODE ANN.

"(1) As provided by Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution,
immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for the recovery
of compensation from the governmental entity when the governmental
entity has taken or damaged private property for public uses without just
compensation. . . . "
4.

§ 63-30-11. Claim for injury - Notice - Contents Service - Legal disability - Appointment of guardian ad litem

UTAH CODE ANN.

"(2) Any person having a claim for injury against a governmental entity, or
against its employee for an act or omission occurring during the
performance of the employee's duties, within the scope of employment, or
under color of authority shall file a written notice of claim with the entity
before maintaining an action, regardless of whether or not the function
giving rise to the claims is characterized as governmental.
(3)
(a) The notice of claim shall set forth:
(i) a brief statement of the facts;
(ii) the nature of the claim asserted; and
(iii) the damages incurred by the claimant so far as they are
known,
(b) The notice shall be
(i) signed by the person making the claim or that person's
agent, attorney, parent, or legal guardian; and
(ii) directed and delivered to
(A) the city or town recorder, when the claim is against
an incorporated city or town...."
5.

§ 63-30-13. Claim against political subdivision or its
employee - Time for filing notice.

UTAH CODE ANN.

5

"A claim against a political subdivision or its employees for an act or
omission occurring during the course of the employee's duties, within the
scope of employment, or under color of authority, is barred unless notice of
claim is filed with the governing body of the political subdivision according
to the requirements of Section 63-30-11 within one year after the claim
arises . . . . "
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act ("Immunity Act"), before a party can
bring a claim against any governmental entity, including a municipality, the party must
direct or deliver a written notice of claim with the entity. If a party is bringing a claim
against a municipality, the notice of claim must be directed to the city recorder. Failure to
properly file a notice of claim bars the plaintiff from bringing the claim against the entity.
The district court was correct in dismissing Plaintiffs state law claims for failure
to comply with the Immunity Act. The Plaintiff failed to file any notice of claim to the
Holladay City Recorder. Furthermore, pursuant to the Immunity Act, Plaintiff had until
December 17, 2003 to file such notice. As the one-year period for compliance with the
notice requirement expired on December 17, 2003, there can be no cure of the
jurisdictional defect now or in the future. Thus, this Court should affirm the district
court's dismissal of Plaintiff s state law claims.
The United States Supreme Court and the Utah Supreme Court have clearly held
that a Fifth Amendment takings claim does not exist until the plaintiff has availed
themselves and been denied just compensation via a state law inverse condemnation
6

claim. The district court was correct in dismissing Plaintiffs federal takings claims for
lack of ripeness because Plaintiff has not yet availed itself and been denied just
compensation in a state law inverse condemnation action. Thus, this Court should affirm
the district court's dismissal of Plaintiff s federal claims.
ARGUMENT
I.

The District Court Was Correct in Dismissing Plaintiffs State Takings
Claim For Failure to Comply With the Notice-of-Claim Requirements
of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act

Pursuant to Utah's Governmental Immunity Act, UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30-1, et
seq. ("the Immunity Act"), proper notice of claim is a jurisdictional prerequisite to any
damages action against a political subdivision such as Holladay City:
A claim against a political subdivision or its employees for an act or
omission occurring during the course of the employee's duties, within the
scope of employment, or under color of authority, is barred unless notice
of claim is filed with the governing body of the political subdivision
according to the requirements of Section 63-30-11 within one year after
the claim arises. . . .
UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30-13 (emphasis added); see also Wheeler v. McPherson, 40 P.3d
632, 636-37 (Utah 2002). The Immunity Act provides that a notice of claim shall be
"directed and delivered to . . . the city or town recorder, when the claim is against an
incorporated city or town." UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30-1 l(3)(b)(ii)(A).
Utah Courts have consistently held that the Immunity Act's notice requirements
are to be strictly construed and enforced. See e.g. Gurule v. Salt Lake County, 69 P.3d
7

1287, 1289 (Utah 2003) ("court has long required strict compliance"); Bellonio v. Salt
Lake City Corp., 911 P.2d 1294,1297 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) ("Utah Courts have typically
required strict compliance with the notice of claim requirements.. .."); Bischel v. Merritt,
907 P.2d 275, 279 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) ("Utah Courts have established a rule of strict
compliance with the notice provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.").
Neither actual notice to the appropriate city official nor other reasonably strict compliance
is sufficient. See Gurule, 69 P.3d at 1289. In fact, any deviance from the clear and
unambiguous requirements set forth in § 63-30-11 will bar a plaintiffs claim against a
governmental entity. See Bellonio, 911 P.2d at 1296 (failure to strictly comply with the
notice requirements of § 63-30-11 barred claim against a city).
Here, the incident constituting the City's final rejection of the Plaintiffs proposal
giving rise to Plaintiffs claim occurred on December 17, 2002. See Complaint, R. at 7,
and 25-29. The purported notice of claim provided by the Plaintiff on January 22, 2003,
was directed and delivered to then-Mayor Larkin, not to the City Recorder. See Exhibit
B, R. at 30. The Plaintiffs failed to "direct or deliver" any notice of claim to Holladay
City Recorder Jerry Medina or his successor, Deputy Holladay City Recorder Stephanie
Carlson, on or before the December 17, 2003, deadline for such notice.
It is clear that the Plaintiff failed to strictly comply with the Immunity Act's notice
requirements, which deprived the district court of subject matter jurisdiction. Further, as
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the one-year period for compliance with the notice requirements expired on December 17,
2003, there can be no cure of the jurisdictional defect now or in the future. Under these
circumstances, the only appropriate course of action was the dismissal of the Plaintiffs
claims with prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Gurule, 69 P.3d at 1289
("trial court was correct in dismissing the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction");
Wheeler, 40 P.3d at 638 ("we affirm the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' suit for
lack of jurisdiction").
The Plaintiffs first argument is that Article I, § 22 of the Utah Constitution is selfexecuting and is not subject to the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.1 Aplt. Brief at 10.
In support of their argument, Plaintiff cites to Coleman v. Utah State LandBd., 795 P.2d
622 (Utah 1990). Coleman, however, is distinguishable from the present case.2 A
reading of Coleman shows that the issue was not the procedural requirements of the
Immunity Act, but rather the substantive immunity given to government entities under the
Immunity Act. The Utah Supreme Court held in Coleman that under Article 1, § 22,
government entities were not immune from a takings claim. Id, at 635. The Court did not

!

The fact that a constitutional provision is self-executing has no bearing on
whether that provision is subject to the Immunity Act. Rather, if a constitutional
provision is self-executing, it simply means the provision "is one that can be judicially
enforced without implementing legislation." Spackman ex rel Spackman, 16 P.3d at 535.
2

This is likely the reason why the lower court's memorandum decision does not
mention Coleman, See Aplt. Brief at 13.
9

hold that a plaintiff bringing a state takings claim was exempt from the notice
requirement under § 63-30-11. All of the other cases Plaintiffs cite in support of their
argument, Hamblin v. City of Clearfield, 795 P.2d 1133 (Utah 1990), Farmers New World
Life Ins, Co. v. Bountiful City, 803 P.2d 1241 (Utah 1990), Bateman v. City of West
Bountiful 89 F.3d 704 (10th Cir. 1996) and Spackman v. Board of Education, 16 P.3d
533 (Utah 2000) also deal with substantive immunity under UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-3010.5 rather than the procedural requirements under the Immunity Act.
While the Plaintiff may ponder why Pig's Gun Club, Inc. v. Sanpete County, 42
P.3d 379 (Utah 2002), does not address Colman v. Utah State LandBd, 795 P.2d 622
(Utah 1990), the answer is quite simple. Colman and its progeny, as explained above,
examined substantive sovereign immunity under the Immunity Act and Article I, Section
22. Pig's Gun Club examined the procedural requirements of the Act's notice
provisions. As determined by the Utah Court of Appeals in Nielson v. Gurley, 888 P.2d
130 (Utah App. 1994) the substantive immunity provisions of the act are separate and
independent from the procedural notice provisions and are entitled to a separate analysis.
The "limitations" examined by Colman and the other prt-Pig's Gun Club cases cited by
the Plaintiffs clearly address only the substantive sovereign immunity otherwise granted
by the Act.
The other post-Pig's Gun Club cases cited by the Plaintiff are equally irrelevant.
10

In Security Investment Ltd. v. Brown, 47 P.3d 97 (Utah 2002), the Court disagreed with
the plaintiffs' premise that their claims arose under Article I, Section 22 of the Utah
Constitution and accordingly never reached the notice issue. Id. at 100. The quoted
portion of B.AM Dev., L.L.C v. Salt Lake County, 87 P.3d 710 (Utah Ct. App. 2004)
represents a footnote to the dissenting opinion that does not address the notice
requirement at all but again refers to the substantive sovereign immunity analysis
contained in Colman, supra.
Pig's Gun Club, supra, conclusively establishes that the notice requirement of the
Act applies to state law taking claims. The Plaintiff has failed to comply with that notice
requirement and the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear the Plaintiffs state law
claims. See Security Investment, Ltd., 47 P.3d at 101.
Plaintiff argues that the City of Holladay's distinction between substantive
immunity and the procedural requirements of the Immunity Act "appears to be without
support when viewed in the broader context of takings law." Aplt. Brief at 14. In support
of its argument, Plaintiff states that the Utah Supreme Court in Coleman and Pigs Gun
Club did not draw such a distinction. Aplt. Brief at 14. Plaintiffs argument is
unconvincing because the issue in Coleman was on substantive immunity, that is, whether
the defendants were immune from liability, not on whether the plaintiff complied with the
procedural requirements of the Immunity Act. Coleman, 795 P.2d at 630. Thus, the court
11

did not need to examine the procedural requirements of the Immunity Act. In Pigs Gun
Club, since the Utah Supreme Court found that the plaintiffs notice of claim was
deficient, it needed not to address whether the defendants were immune from suit. Pigs
Gun Club, Inc. v. Sanpete County, 42 P.3d 379, 382 (Utah 2002). The final reason given
by Plaintiff against the distinction between substantive immunity and the procedural
requirements of the Immunity Act is that the "only case which discusses the term
'substantive immunity' co-extensively with the Utah Governmental Immunity Act is
Nielson v. Gurleyr Aplt. Brief at 14. In Nielson v. Gurley, 888 P.2d 130 (Utah Ct.
App, 1994), the Court of Appeals found that the notice requirements of the Act
constituted a separate and independent ground of protection to governmental defendants
even in cases where immunity had been waived as to the underlying claim. The Court of
Appeals stated:
[Nielson] confuses the scope of the notice requirement with the extent of
substantive sovereign immunity protection. Complying with the notice
provisions of the Governmental Immunity Act is a jurisdictional
requirement and a precondition to suit, and is in no way co-extensive with
the substantive provisions contained within the Governmental Immunity
Act which insulate the sovereign and its operatives from liability. If, as
Nielson argues, a plaintiff need only provide notice in those situations when
the sovereign may properly invoke immunity under the substantive
provisions of the Act, the notice requirement would be meaningless because
the substantive provisions of sovereign immunity would fully protect the
sovereign and its operatives in any event.
Id. at 135 (footnote and internal citations omitted, emphasis added). As Nielson makes
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clear, the notice requirement is a separate and independent provision of the Act that must
be complied with even in cases where there is no substantive immunity as a matter of
waiver or otherwise. While this may be the only case that uses the phrase "substantive
sovereign immunity" when speaking of the Immunity Act, other courts have found that
the notice requirement is a precondition to suit and is separate analysis from the immunity
provisions of the Immunity Act. See e.g, Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 250 (Utah
1988) (holding that "because the plaintiffs . . . did not give the required notice and
therefore failed to satisfy a precondition to suit, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to
consider the merits of their claim").
Furthermore, separate application of the notice requirement makes sense in light of
the independent purpose that it serves. "The purpose of a notice of claim is to provide the
governmental entity an opportunity to correct the condition that caused the injury,
evaluate the claim, and perhaps settle the matter without the expense of litig2ition." Pig's
Gun Club, 42 P.3d at 382 (internal quotation omitted). In light of the clear statutory and
case law on this subject, their can be no dispute that the notice requirement of the Act
applies to all claims against governmental entities regardless of whether substantive
immunity has been waived for the claims asserted. The Defendants were accordingly
entitled, at the minimum, to dismissal of all of the Plaintiffs state law claims for lack of
jurisdiction.
13

Additional evidence that before bringing a state takings claim a plaintiff must
comply with the notice requirements of UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30-11 is found in a
comparison of § 63-30-5 and § 63-30-10.5. Section 63-30-5 waives immunity for claims
arising from "contractual rights or obligations" and provides that such claims are not
subject to the notice requirements of § 63-30-11. In contrast, while § 63-30-10.5 provides
a waiver of immunity for state takings claims, the section does not provide that such
claims are not subject to the notice requirements of § 63-30-11. If the legislature would
have intended that state takings claims were exempt from the notice requirements of § 6330-11, they would have so provided as they did in § 63-30-5.
In conclusion, the notice requirements of § 63-30-11 apply to Article I, § 22 of the
Utah Constitution. Failure to comply with the notice requirements of the Immunity Act
deprives the district court of subject matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, because Plaintiff
failed to comply with the notice requirement under § 63-30-11, its state law claims
against Holladay City are barred and were correctly dismissed.
II.

The District Court was Correct in Dismissing Plaintiffs § 1983 Takings
Claim Against Holladay City for Lack of Ripeness

"The Fifth Amendment does not proscribe the taking of property; it proscribes
taking without just compensation." Williamson Planning Comm yn v. Hamilton Bank, 473
U.S. 172, 194 (1985). "Nor does the Fifth Amendment require that just compensation be
paid in advance of, or contemporaneously with, the taking; all that is required is that a
14

reasonable, certain and adequate provision for obtaining compensation exist at the time of
the taking." Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). "If the government has
provided an adequate process for obtaining compensation, and if resort to that process
"yield[s] just compensation," then the property owner "has no claim against the
Government" for a taking." Id. (quoting Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986,
1013, 1018, n.21, (1984)). The Court noted that "because the Constitution does not
require pretaking compensation, and is instead satisfied by a reasonable and adequate
provision for obtaining compensation after the taking, the State's action . . . is not
'complete' until the State fails to provide adequate compensation for the taking." Id. at
195. Accordingly, the United States Supreme Court held that "if a State provides an
adequate procedure for seeking just compensation, the property owner cannot claim a
violation of the Just Compensation Clause until it has used the procedure and been denied
just compensation." Id.
Based on the foregoing, the Utah Supreme Court has held that Utah residents are
not permitted to assert federal takings claims without first availing themselves of an
inverse condemnation action under state law. See, e.g., Patterson v. American Fork City,
2003 UT 7, f 35, 67 P.3d 466, 476-77 (citing Williamson, All U.S. at 194) (the Court
held that plaintiffs' Fifth Amendment claim was unripe because the plaintiffs had not
availed themselves of the state inverse condemnation procedure); see also BAM. Dev.,
15

LLC v. Salt Lake County, 87 P.3d 710, 721, n.8 (Utah Ct. App. 2004) (explaining that
under Utah law, "[t]he inverse condemnation action is available to any landowner who
suffers destruction or impairment of a protected private property right.")- Accordingly,
Plaintiffs purported § 1983 claim simply does not exist until the Plaintiff has been denied
just compensation in a state law inverse condemnation action. Because Plaintiffs have yet
to be denied just compensation in a state law inverse condemnation action, Plaintiffs §
1983 takings claim must be dismissed for lack of ripeness.
Plaintiff admits that as a result of Williamson "federal courts now routinely dismiss
federal takings claims and require plaintiffs to litigate state inverse condemnation claims
in state court first." Aplt. Brief at 15. However, Plaintiff attempts to get around clear
U.S. Supreme Court, Tenth Circuit and Utah Supreme Court case law by arguing that this
Court should not adopt a literal interpretation of Williamson because to do so would
preclude the Plaintiff from litigating its § 1983 takings claim since once it "has litigated
state inverse condemnation claims in state court, any subsequent attempt to litigate federal
takings claims in federal court is precluded under the doctrines of res judicata and
collateral estoppel." Aplt. Brief at 16. Plaintiff asserts that "courts have been notably
resistant to an interpretation of Williamson that precludes state courts as a proper initial
venue for federal takings claims," and then asks this Court to find as other courts have
that "the proper, and only, venue, following Williamson, for raising federal takings claims
16

is in state court." Id, Plaintiffs argument must be rejected because first, Williamson is
unambiguous in its holding that a Fifth Amendment takings claim is not ripe before a
plaintiff has sought and been denied just compensation via a state law inverse
condemnation proceeding, and second, there is binding precedent that supports the
Defendant's and the lower court's interpretation of Williamson.
In Williamson, the United States Supreme Court held that "if a State provides an
adequate procedure for seeking just compensation, the property owner cannot claim a
violation of the Just Compensation Clause until it has used the procedure and been denied
just compensation." 473 U.S. at 194. In so holding, the Supreme Court in Williamson did
not draw a distinction between asserting a Fifth Amendment claim in federal court and
asserting a Fifth Amendment claim in state court. For example, the Court did not say that
a property owner cannot claim a violation of the Just Compensation Clause in federal
court until it has availed itself and been denied just compensation via a state court
proceeding. Still, Plaintiff wants to interpret Williamson as only precluding "federal
courts as an initial venue for litigating federal takings claims" and allowing federal
takings claims to be brought initially in state court. Aplt. Brief at 15. However,
Plaintiffs interpretation of Williamson contradicts the clear wording of the opinion. In
Williamson the Supreme Court clearly stated that a plaintiff who has not availed itself of a
state procedure for seeking just compensation and been denied cannot assert a Fifth
17

Amendment claim irrespective if it is initially brought in state of federal court.
Case law supports the Defendant's and the lower court's interpretation of
Williamson. For example, the Tenth Circuit in Miller v. Campbell County v. United
States, 945 F.2d 348 (10th Cir. 1991), held that "[i]n those states that allow aggrieved
property owners to bring an inverse condemnation action in order to recover
compensation for property taken by the state, a Fifth Amendment takings claim is not ripe
until the aggrieved property owner has used the procedure and been denied just
compensation" (citation omitted). The Tenth Circuit did not draw a distinction as to what
court, either federal or state, a plaintiff was precluded from asserting a Fifth Amendment
claim, but simply stated that until the plaintiff has used the state court procedure and been
denied just compensation could the plaintiff allege a Fifth Amendment takings claim.
Plaintiff asserts that "Utah state courts have not had the opportunity to fully
explore this issue and provide a definitive opinion." Aplt. Brief at 15. Plaintiffs
assertion is unfounded because the State's highest court has recently interpreted
Williamson in a manner consistent with the lower court's judgment that is binding upon
this Court. Patterson v. American Fork City, 67 P.3d 466 (Utah 2003).3 In Patterson,

3

This Court is bound to follow Utah Supreme Court precedent. See State v.
Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 398, n.3 (Utah 1994) (explaining the Utah Court of Appeal's duty
to strictly adhere to Utah Supreme Court precedent, pursuant to the doctrine of stare
decisis).
18

several real estate developers brought a § 1983 claim against American Fork in which
they asserted a deprivation of their Fifth Amendment rights based on the city's refusal to
permit development at certain locations. Id. at 468-70. However, the real estate
developers had failed to utilize a state law takings claim prior to asserting their federal
claims. Id. at 477. Accordingly, the Utah Supreme Court, citing Williamson, dismissed
the developers' federal claims on the grounds that they were not ripe:
We also find that the trial court was correct to dismiss
Pattersons' Fifth Amendment takings claim. The Supreme
Court has held that "[i]f the government has provided an
adequate process for obtaining compensation, and if resort to
that process '[yields] just compensation,' then the property
owner 'has no claim against the Government for a taking."
[citation to cases omitted] In Utah, the appropriate posttaking remedy is an inverse condemnation action, and
Pattersons have not utilized that remedy. "Unless and until
plaintiffs avail themselves of [the inverse condemnation]
remedy, their takings claim will remain unripe." [citation
omitted]
Id at 476-77 (alterations to quotations in original). The State's highest court interpreted
Williamson in accordance with the Defendant's and the lower court's interpretation of
Williamson. What Plaintiff asks is for this Court to overrule last years Supreme Court
decision. However, this Court must follow binding precedent and interpret Williamson
likewise by holding that Plaintiffs failure to use and be denied just compensation via a
state law inverse condemnation proceeding bars Plaintiffs § 1983 Takings Claim.
Plaintiff attempts to distinguish Patterson from the present case by asserting that in
19

Patterson "the court dismissed plaintiffs federal takings claims because plaintiffs, unlike
Heughs Land, had not availed themselves of a state inverse condemnation remedies."
Aplt. Brief at 15. Plaintiffs attempt to distinguish the present case from Patterson is
unpersuasive because while the plaintiff in Patterson may have failed to utilize a state
inverse condemnation action, the Plaintiff in this case has not yet been denied just
compensation in a state inverse condemnation action, and both are required under
Williamson in order for a federal takings claim to be ripe.
Furthermore, the lack of ripeness of Plaintiff s § 1983 takings claim does not work
any particular injustice on the Plaintiff or any other potential takings claimant. The
Plaintiff has never been denied a forum or an opportunity to vindicate its property rights
under the U.S. Constitution. Rather, the Plaintiff was afforded the opportunity to fully
and fairly litigate its right to compensation by properly bringing a state law inverse
condemnation claim. This full and fair litigation would likely have completely redressed
any violation of the Plaintiffs federal rights, but it cannot now occur due to the Plaintiffs
own failure to comply with state law procedural requirements.
CONCLUSION
The lower court was correct in dismissing Plaintiffs state and federal claims.
First, Plaintiff failed to comply with the notice requirements of UTAH CODE ANN. § 6330-11 by not directing or delivering to the Holladay City Recorder a Notice of Claim.
20

Failure to comply with the notice requirements of the immunity act is an absolute bar to
suite. Thus, the lower court was correct in dismissing Plaintiffs Art. I, § 22 takings
claim. Finally, Plaintiffs § 1983 takings claim is unripe because Plaintiff has not yet
availed itself and been denied just compensation via a state law inverse condemnation
proceeding. Therefore, the lower court was correct in dismissing Plaintiffs § 1983
takings claim. Accordingly, Defendant respectfully requests this Court to uphold the
lower court's dismissal of Plaintiff s claims in their entirety.
DATED this ££

day of December, 2004.
STIRBA & ASSOCIATES

PE^E^STIRBA
GREGORY P. NIELSEN
Attorneys for City of Holladay
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 9*
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true copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE, by the method indicated below, to the
following:

Anthony J. Rampton, Esq.
Angela E. Atkin, Esq.
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & MCDONOUGH
170 So. Main, Suite 1500
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
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